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THE FORMULAIC CONSTITUTION
Robert F Nagel*
The Supreme Court'sconstitutionaljurisprudenceof late has been filled with formulae - tests that must be met, hurdles that must be overcome. This multi-pronged analytical technique is, accordingto Professor
Nagel, distancing the Justices from both their audience, the American
public, and their text, the Constitution. In an effort to retain the authority
of that text, the Court is instead displacingit; in an effort to persuade that
audience, the Court is instead excluding it. Furthermore,the Court'sattempt to constrain judges has actually created an irresponsiblejudicial
freedom, while its attempt to locate a middle ground between the factresponsiveness of realism and the abstractnessof conceptualism has in reality led to a regulatory, abstract, and adversarialperspective. The way
the Court talks affects the society in which it wields power. If constitutional law is to educate and motivate the members of that society, it must,
ProfessorNagel submits, become more collaborativeand less complete.
INTRODUCTION

During roughly the last thirty years a new style of opinion writing
has emerged as the most common method of constitutional exegesis.'
This style emphasizes formalized doctrine expressed in elaborately
layered sets of "tests" or "prongs" or "requirements" or "standards"
or "hurdles." The judicial opinions in which these "analytical devices' 2 appear tend to be characterized by tireless, detailed debate
among the Justices. The apparently definitive formulations, standing
amidst a welter of separate opinions and contentious footnotes, seem
forlorn testaments to the ideals of clarity and consensus. But, taken
together, the formulae and the extensive explanation comprise a consistent pattern of earnest argumentation.
The formulaic style is so familiar and so consonant with the times
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1968, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1972,
Yale University. - Ed.
This article was the subject of colloquia at the law schools of the University of Colorado and
Northwestern University. I am grateful to the participants for their interest and criticisms. In
addition, Alfred T. McDonnell, James E. Scarboro, and James B. White were generous in providing insightful comments. At various stages Stephanie Boyer, Kevin Daly, and Marjorie Sloan
contributed useful research assistance.

1. The style is evident in several nonconstitutional areas as well. See, eg., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1982) (meaning of "under color of law" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69 (1982) (availability of habeas corpus review under
28 U.S.C. § 2254); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (availability of private causes of action).
2. A phrase used in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that judges, academics, and lawyers take it for granted. This inatten-

tion, while not entirely surprising, is misguided. In the highly variable
and fragmented world of constitutional interpretation the formulaic
style is one of the few basic fixtures. The areas that it has been used to
4
explicate include: freedom of speech, 3 separation of church and state,
5
6
state sovereignty, equal protection, due process (both substan3. Modem free speech cases are especially prone to formulae. A clear example is the
"O'Brien test" for mixed speech and nonspeech. See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
Other examples abound. The "test" for defining obscenity is:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). The standards for evaluating
restrictions on "child pornography" are:
[T]he conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as
written or authoritatively construed.... [Tihe state offense [must] be limited to words that
visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age. The category of "sexual
conduct" proscribed must also be suitably limited and described.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The
"four-part" analysis for commercial speech cases is
[first] whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govemmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). "Time, place
and manner" restrictions on speech are approved
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
4. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citation omitted).
5. This test, now at least temporarily abandoned, was employed by the Court in a series of
cases beginning in 1981 with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S.
264. See note 107 infra and accompanying text.
6. One version of the so-called "strict scrutiny" standard is:
In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or
interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is "necessary ... to the accomplishment" of its purpose or the safeguarding of its
interest.
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (footnotes omitted). The subtleties of phrasing are
clearly presented in the variations on the "middle-level" of scrutiny used in sex discrimination
cases. One formulation states:
To withstand constitutional challenge ... classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). A more recent version is:
[The party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender
must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves "important
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tive7 and procedural"), the case and controversy requirement, 9 the
commerce power, 10 the contract clause,11 the privileges and immunigovernmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are "substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."
[This test] must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) (citations and footnote
omitted).
7. The most well-known due process formulation is the trimester-based test for restrictions
on the right to abortion:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State,
in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
8. [R]esolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures... are constitutionally
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. More
precisely,... identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (citations omitted).
9. [A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant" . . . and that the injury "fairly can be
traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations and footnote omitted).
10. See, eg., notes 53 & 171 infra and accompanying text. Another version of the correct
"principles" in "dormant" commerce clause cases is:
(I) The courts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers
concerning the utility of legislation.
(2) The burdens imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually
sought to be achieved by the State's lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the
fact by counsel.
(3) Protectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the
burdens and benefits are related to safety rather than economics.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679-80 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). The test for state taxes on interstate activities sustains the taxes when evaluated according
to "practical effect" rather than "formal language":
[The Court has] sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied
to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
11. The threshold inquiry is "whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship." ...
If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in justification,
must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation ....
Once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next inquiry is whether the
adjustment of "the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reason-
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ties clause of article IV,12 the fifth amendment right against self-in-

crimination, 13 and the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 14 Its
influence can also be seen in cases interpreting the sixth amendment

(both the right to effective counsel' 5 and the right to conduct one's

own defense1 6) and the fourth amendment (including cases defining
"reasonable" 1 7 and "searches" '8 ). Moreover, although it is now cusable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption."
Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).
12. Application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to a particular instance of discrimination against out-of-state residents entails a two-step inquiry. As an initial matter, the
Court must decide whether the ordinance burdens one of those privileges and immunities
protected by the Clause.... As a threshold matter, then, we must determine whether an
out-of-state resident's interest in employment on public works contracts in another State is
sufficiently "fundamental" to the promotion of interstate harmony so as to "fall within the
purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause."
The conclusion that [an] ordinance discriminates against a protected privilege does not,
of course, end the inquiry ... where there is a "substantial reason" for the difference in
treatment. "[Tihe inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do
exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them."
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218-22 (1984) (citations omitted).
13. The "two-step analysis" for waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel is:
[B]efore a suspect in custody can be subjected to further interrogation after he requests an
attorney there must be a showing that the "suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities."
*.. [W]here reinterrogation follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to show
that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel
present during the interrogation.
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983).
14. [A] court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by
objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii)
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
15. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require
reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must
show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
16. First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he
chooses to present to the jury....
Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be
allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
17. []n determining whether the seizure and search were "unreasonable" our inquiry is a
dual one - whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
18. My understanding of the rule... is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
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tomary, the style is not especially natural; it is obtrusively elaborate
rather than economical or elegant. Why has the modem Supreme
Court so persistently adopted this cumbersome expository device?
This essay explores the ways in which the formulaic style is different from other, older forms of constitutional doctrine. It argues that
the modem style affects the content that the Court finds in the Constitution and that it illuminates the current interpretive functions of the
judiciary. Perhaps most importantly, the formulaic style establishes
an identifiable relationship between the Court and the public and thus
constrains how the Court's version of the Constitution bears upon the
larger political culture.

This subject matter might seem to put too much weight on the
shape, as opposed to the substance, of opinions. Therefore, before
turning to a detailed examination of the formulaic style, I address the
relationship between form and substance in constitutional law.
I.

FORM AND SUBSTANCE

In some ways it is certainly plausible to believe that only the substance of judicial opinions matters. To take the most significant example, no one doubts the profound importance of the Court's declaration
that racial segregation in schools and other public arenas is unconstitutional. The great mass of the public, whose jobs do not require reading or dwelling on judicial opinions, was made to understand this
result. But it is doubtful that the Court's reasoning, much less the
manner of its presentation, filtered past a few elite groups. The
Court's more prosaic efforts at constitutional interpretation are certainly understood even more dimly and basically; they are obscured by
inattention and by layers of imprecise reports from newspapers, attorneys, word-of-mouth within bureaucracies, and so on. Thus even to
say that the "result" is important - in the sense that police give Miranda warnings or school officials provide hearings before suspensions
- is to overstate the case, for bottom-line constitutional requirements
are frequently distorted in the public perception. In that perception
the Court's results are converted into vague intuitions and diffuse values. Prison officials sometimes interpret as broad attacks on institutional authority judicial decisions that provide only limited protections
for inmates' constitutional rights. 19 Many journalists apparently understand the "malice" requirement of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. An insightful account of the reactions to judicial decisions of both prison officials and
inmates is J. JACOaS, STATEVILLE, THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 107-13, 117-19

(1977).
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2
as being far more an absolute protection than it is.
0 When even fun-

damental outcomes and reasoning are so imprecisely communicated, 21
claiming an importance

for expository

style seems

absurdly

otherworldly.
Justice Cardozo, nevertheless, once dismissed lawyers' generally
"amused or cynical indifference" to literary style as an indication of a

failure of understanding. 22 In judicial opinions, he asserted somewhat

dogmatically, form and substance are inseparable: "The strength that
is born of form and the feebleness that is born of the lack of form are
in truth qualities of the substance. They are tokens of the thing's iden''23 Form,
tity. They make it what it is.
perhaps, makes substance

"what it is" for those few specialists who view Supreme Court opinions more as intellectual or aesthetic efforts than as coercive acts of the
sovereign. For some academics and judges, form is inseparable from
substance because they read opinions in order to be persuaded or
moved or even inspired. 24 Still, from the perspective of the general
citizenry (and its lawyers), Cardozo's emphasis on style seems a pre-

cious irrelevancy. To the extent that the issue is identifying behavior
that might have to be altered because of judicial decrees, form is im-

portant only to the extent that it renders essential information too unclear to be understood.
In at least two other respects, however, form is of real, general
importance. First, because judicial decisions are coercive, the public
has the strongest possible interest in the capacity of the Court to re-

solve constitutional issues. Both traditional justifications for judicial
review (for example, enforcing the framers' intentions under current
20. The requirement of "knowing or reckless" disregard for the truth always contained the
seeds of intrusive inquiries into the journalists' motivations, but, despite its precise content, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), quickly became a symbol of general immunization. These high hopes, perhaps, explain the outraged cries of betrayal that followed, for example, a rather predictable decision holding that political motivations (and "muckraking" styles)
are relevant to "recklessness." See Nagel, How to Stop Libel Suits and Still Protect Individual
Reputation, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Nov. 1985, at 12.
21. Indeed, scholars sometimes describe the "meaning" of a decision in terms that have almost nothing to do with either holding or reasoning. See, e.g., P. BOBBrrT, CONsTITUTIONAL
FATE, THEORY OF THE CONsTrrtr oN 213-19 (1982) ("The holding in the Tapes Case [United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)] is not the preposterous one stated by the Court.... The
real holding is that a President ...may not manipulate the instrumentalities of law enforcement
both to prevent the law's enforcement and to acquit himself.").
22. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 14 YALE REV. 699, 700 (1925). This essay was reprinted
in 39 COLUM. L. REv. 119, 120; 52 HARV. L. REV. 471, 472; and 48 YALE L.J. 489, 490, all in
1939 in special issues upon the occasion of Cardozo's death.
23. Id.
24. Some of the needs that scholars attempt to fulfill by attention to Supreme Court opinions
are explored in Nagel, On ComplainingAbout the Burger Court (Book Review), 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 2068 (1984).
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conditions) and disparate modem justifications (removing impediments to effective democratic accountability, protecting "personhood," giving meaning to "public values," and so on) require the
Court to resolve issues of enormous difficulty. 25 One need not believe
that form and substance are identical to understand that ways of talking about the Constitution must influence patterns of thought. Because analysis and explanation are not entirely separate processes, the
form of the opinion must be expressive of the intellectual habits that
shape the Court's conclusions. Therefore, to describe the Court's expository style is to identify the idiom that not only expresses the
Court's version of the Constitution but also inclines the Court toward
it. It is important to know, then, whether a formulaic constitution
provides intellectual resources and instincts commensurate with the
functions that are thought to legitimize the Court's power to coerce.
Second, neither the Court nor its many defenders believes that its
authority over the public is exhausted by successful communication of
specific behavioral norms. The Court should (it is said) teach a sophisticated theory of free speech to a recalcitrant public. 26 The Court is
supposed to lead alienated combatants "toward the pursuit of mutual
accommodation." 27 It should provide a forum for the application of
moral philosophy to public affairs.2 8 It should speak as a prophet,
calling the nation back to its animating moral vision. 29 It should be
"the voice of the spirit, reminding us of our better selves." 3 0° The Constitution is said to be "our Mona Lisa, our Eiffel Tower, our
Marseillaise," and the Court should have a primary role "in establishing our aesthetic principles .... ,,31
Oddly, many of those who would assign such weighty, sometimes
exotic, communicative functions to the Supreme Court do not dwell
on the Court's language. To a surprising extent, they speak as if morally uplifting results (if only the Court will produce them) are a sufi25. The difficulty of giving concrete meaning to such vague modem ideals as "personhood"
and "public values" is self-evident. The complexities involved in serious efforts to accomplish the
more traditional goals of deriving meaning from the framers' intentions or from the document's
text are illustrated, respectively, in Tushnet, Followingthe Rules Laid Down: A CritiqueofInterpretivism andNeutralPrinciples,96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 786 andpassim (1983), and in Laycock,
Taking ConstitutionsSeriously: A Theory ofJudicialReview (Book Review), 59 TExAs L. REV.
343, 360 and passim (1981).
26. E.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN (1970).
27. Burt, The Burger Court and the Family, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 92, 107 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
28. Eg., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); Fiss, Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979).
29. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
30. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 117 (1976).
31. P. BoBBrrT, supra note 21, at 185.
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cient mechanism for achieving objectives like cultural or historical
identity and moral growth. 32 An exception is Professor James B.
White, who writes:
The law... provides a place that is at once part of the larger culture
and apart from it, a place in which we can think about a problematic
story by retelling it in various ways and can ask in a new and self-conscious way what it is to mean. Law works by a process of argument that
places one version of events against another and creates a tension between them (and between the endings appropriate to each); in doing so it
makes our choice of language conscious rather than habitual and creates
a moment at which controlled change of language and culture becomes
33
possible.
White describes the constitutional text as speaking both authoritatively and modestly - forcefully allocating responsibility and yet leaving much to be decided later. The document establishes "the
fundamental terms of new kinds of conversation; for it creates a set of
speakers, defines the occasions for and topics of their speech .... -34
There is nothing magical or obscure about the claim that the Con35
stitution (and decisions applying it) create a rhetorical "community"
by which aspects of our culture are defined and redefined. The form of
the Constitution is expressive, and the document's power is symbolic
as well as behavioral. Consider the almost preternatural force of the
Constitution in our political and legal culture. Judges (and others)
36
have long employed religious terms in speaking of the Constitution.
Serious scholars refer to constitutional interpretation as moral prophecy and as giving voice to the spirit. A Congresswoman stirs, not em32. For example, in places Professor Bobbitt writes as if the "expressive" function of the
Court is independent of what it actually says in its opinions. See P. BOBBiTr, supra note 21.
Professor Perry refers almost exclusively to outcomes when making his claim that the Court
helps society achieve moral progress. See, eg., Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights
Cases: A FunctionalJustification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 314-15 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Perry, NoninterpretiveReview]; see also Fiss, supra note 28, at 30 (arguing that adjudication gives
"meaning to our public values" by enforcing or creating norms); Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, andReason: A Theory of Constitutional"Interpretation,"58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 577
(1985) (claiming that case outcomes demonstrate that the Court builds the traditions of political
community). Even Professor Tushnet, who emphasizes that constitutional interpretation is derivative from shared understandings within the community, shows little interest in the possibility
that judicial review may be destructive of "shared system[s] of meanings." See Tushnet, supra
note 25, at 824-27; Tushnet, A Note on The Revival of Textualism in ConstitutionalTheory, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 683, 683-92 (1985).
33. J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING 273 (1984); see also B. BARBER,
STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 152-85 (1984); Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
34. J. WHITE, supra note 33, at 245.
35. Id. at 251 and passim.
36. Justice Black titled his book A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968). For general discussions
of religiosity, see Lemer, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294-95 (1937);
Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. Cr. REV. 123.
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barrassment, but deep admiration, when she declares that her faith in

the Constitution is "whole. It is complete. It is total."' 37 A prominent
scholar, tight-lipped and angry, responds to skeptics by saying that
their nihilism about constitutional interpretation "threatens our social
existence and the nature of public life as we know it in America; and it
demeans our lives."' 38 Even those nihilists try to find in the Constitution a vindication of their morality and of themselves. 39 What is it
about the document that arouses such impassioned loyalty and such
ceaselessly fervent hopes?
The great wisdom contained in its text notwithstanding, the emo-

tive power of the Constitution does not result merely from the sub-

40
stance of the document. Some of that content is thought to be petty,
wrongheaded, 4 1 outdated, 42 or even reprehensible. 43 Moreover, one of

the central problems of constitutional theory is that many of the most
admirable values attributed to the Constitution are exceedingly diffi-

cult to trace convincingly to its text.44
37. B. JORDAN & S. HEARON, BARBARA JORDAN, A SELF-PORTRAIT 187 (1979) (recounting her address to the House Judiciary Committee during consideration of articles of impeachment against President Nixon).
38. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 763 (1982).
39. E.g., Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory - And its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223,
223-24, 257-59 (1981); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributionsof John Hart
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1058-60 (1980).
40. This phenomenon is given amusing treatment in Kaus, ConstitutionalBoo-Boos, AM.
LAW., Mar. 1982, at 51. An example is art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which provides:
The President... may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices
41. Many serious people would judge the second amendment's right to keep and bear arms as
fundamentally misguided (at least if it were enforced). Early experience with the requirement
that the President seek "the advice and consent" of the Senate was a failure and has been consistently ignored. See H. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 104-05
(1925). There is a venerable tradition of criticizing the principle of separation of powers as a
fundamental mistake. See, eg., K. LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 244-50 (1957); W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
42. Professor Choper, among others, suggested that the principle of federalism has "outlived
its usefulness." J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 25556 (1980). Other examples include the third amendment (prohibition against quartering soldiers)
and section 2 of the fourteenth amendment (number of representatives apportioned by excluding
"Indians not taxed").

43. See art. I, § 9, cl. 1:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
See also art. IV, § 2, cl. 3:
No Person held to Service or Labor in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labor may be due.
44. The central example, of course, is school desegregation. See, eg., Bickel, The Original
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Alternatively, the Constitution's lure might be thought to rest, not
on a complete reading of the text itself, but from American experience
with interpretations of aspects of the text. The text, that is, might be
thought to contain enough parts or hints of grand values that it has
been susceptible to inspirational interpretations. It is this potential,
revealed in the brilliant adaptations of American institutions throughout the nation's history, that fascinates and attracts.
Although this explanation surely contains seeds of truth, it has
much to overcome. After all, to a degree that is often underestimated,
the most basic institutional successes - such as the regular relinquishment of the office of the Presidency, or the timely assembly of Congress each year, or the continued existence of the states as
governments - have occurred without significant assistance from
legal interpretation.4 5 Some successful adaptations, moreover, have
46
consisted in emptying inconvenient provisions of any meaning.
Through much of our history parts of the document now thought to
47
be especially inspirational were largely ignored by the judiciary.
Parts that were not ignored were interpreted so as to help bring on the
Civil War, to block the effort to achieve equal rights for blacks during
Reconstruction, and to threaten the authority of the central government to deal with the Great Depression. For every truly inspirational
interpretation, there are many failures: the chaotic efforts to define
"obscenity," the willingness to uphold convictions under the Espionage Act during World War I, and the failure to protect Japanese
Americans from internment during World War II. Moreover, many
decisions that for some count as "successes" in fact involve tawdry
facts or painfully ambiguous moral dilemmas. If our deep attachment
to the Constitution arises from its capacity to be interpreted to proUnderstandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955). But similar difficulties
surround almost all the highly regarded decisions of the modem era. See Perry, Interpretivism,
Freedom ofExpression, andEqual Protection,42 OHIo ST. L.J. 261, 284-301 (1981) (arguing that
virtually all human rights decisions in this century have neither textual nor historical
justification).
45. See Nagel, Interpretationand Importance in ConstitutionalLaw: A Re-Assessment of JudicialRestraint, in NOMOS XXV, LIBERAL DEMOCiACY 181, 187-93 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds., 1983).
46. This occurred, for example, with the "advice and consent" clause. See note 41 supra. It
has been the general history of the tenth amendment since 1937. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1959) (arguing that the Court had
virtually abandoned limits on federal commerce power); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
47. The principle of freedom of speech, for example, was largely ignored or resisted for more
than a century. See Rabban, The FirstAmendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514

(1981).
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hibit visual barriers around outdoor theaters 48 or to sanction a nearly
absolute personal prerogative to destroy fetal life, 49 then our attachment comes from strange sources.
Only an exceedingly selective view of the history of constitutional
interpretation can explain the fervor of the American fascination with
"our Mona Lisa." The document, plainly, is able to represent our
highest hopes despite much of its content and despite much of our
historical experience. The emotional pull generated by the Constitution, no doubt, has many explanations. But some part of the document's power must result from the relative simplicity and authority of
the language, as well as from its frequently inspirational generality.
In order to appreciate the significance of the Constitution's form, it
is only necessary to imagine a radical proposal to amend the present
text. The proposal might, for example, begin with two widely different
provisions: the first amendment's flat injunction that "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.. ." and article I's
simple declaration that "The Congress shall have power... to regulate commerce ... . among the several states ... ." One provision
withholds power, the other authorizes it. The unequivocal language in
each promises that governmental affairs can be arranged properly and
that the correct principles need not be complicated or compromised.
These are powerfully attractive promises that still work their effect on
those beguiled by the "possibility that there are right answers" 50 and
on those who fear for the republic whenever some putative constitutional principle is compromised.5 1
48. The Court viewed the issue as one of content discrimination against nudity. Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
49. Although in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1977), the Court pointed to a number of
serious concerns that might motivate an abortion, its formulation protects the right during the
first two trimesters no matter how frivolous or odious the woman's motives might be.
50. Perry, NoninterpretiveReview, supra note 32, at 295.
51. Although it is understandable that interest groups, such as journalists, would see disaster
behind every interpretation they disapprove of, see eg., Nagel, supranote 20, self-interest cannot
explain similar kinds of reactions by scholars. The distinguished professor Archibald Cox, for
example, went before Congress to oppose the Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution.
He testified that the Amendment threatened "the ancient framework of American government
and constitutional liberties of citizens." ConstitutionalAmendments Seeking to Balance the
Budget and Limit FederalSpending: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 542, 545 (1982) (statement of Professor Archibald Cox, Chairman, Common Cause) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson
Amendments]. Similarly, he testified that the proposed "Human Life Bill," which would have
deemed fetal life to be human life for limited purposes under the due process clause, was a
"radical and dangerously unprincipled attack upon the foundations of our constitutionalism."
The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S.158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 331, 346 (1981) (statement of Professor
Archibald Cox). The certitude that lies at the base of such fears was revealed in Professor Cox's
assertion that "the Constitution is confined to those enduring fundamentals upon the essence of
which we are all agreed." Hearings on Amendments, supra, at 542.
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The absolutism of the language in both provisions, of course, is a
matter of tone. In fact neither provision is absolute, because each is so
general and cryptic - characteristics that allow many divergent
groups to see their "truths" as authoritatively enshrined. While appearing to sanction only a single proper mechanism, the language permits many, various arrangements. It is a fundamental law that invites
everyone to be right, that creates a culture of inclusive rectitude.
Now, suppose that the free speech clause and the commerce clause
were to be replaced by the kinds of formulae that the Court has used
to implement them. The first amendment would become a forbiddingly complex set of tests, including:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same
course of conduct.., a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inciis no greater
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
52
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
The commerce clause would also be a series of elaborate provisions,
one of which would require inquiry into
(1) whether [a state] statute regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate
commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute
serves a legitimate local purpose; and if so, (3) whether alternative means
as well without discriminating against
could promote this local
53 purpose
interstate commerce.
If such judicial constructions were substituted for the present text,
the importance of style would be sadly evident. The amended constitution would replace a simple authorization to the central government
with a complex set of constraints on the States. It would change an
absolute prohibition ("Congress shall make no law") into an equivocal
authorization ("a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if
.. "). It would substitute uncertain modifications and redundancies
("an important or substantial" and "either on its face or in practical
effect") for self-confident simplicity ("no law" and "shall have"). The
specific and the banal ("When speech and nonspeech elements are
combined," and "promote this local purpose as well without discriminating") would replace the general and the cryptic. In short, the new
constitution would be complicated, hesitant, specific yet confusing,
and demanding yet without natural authority. It would be contrived
rather than inspired. It could promise neither certitude nor inclusive52. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
53. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
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ness. It could promote debate and litigation but not loyalty, passion,
or faith.
Although much of the "constitution" conveyed in modem
Supreme Court opinions is this formulaic constitution, the Court has
not, of course, exactly amended the Constitution. The formulaic opinions supplement rather than replace the original text. Moreover, the
form appropriate for the original document is not necessarily appropriate for its application. Nevertheless, the Court's opinions are the
most authoritative way in which the original text is explained to the
public. There is a yawning gap between the Court's preferred style of
communication and its functions. Those functions require that the
Court's style of expression, although perhaps different from that of the
original text, be capable of great subtlety and force. The debate over
the Court's role, however, proceeds for the most part with a strange
disregard for the capacities and limitations suggested by the idiom
with which the Court so often intervenes in the culture.

II.

FORM AND FUNCTION

The formulaic style does not inspire, but what functions does it
serve? Why does the Court often use language so different from that
of the document that it is interpreting? To what audience and with
what voice is the Court speaking? Reliance on the formulaic style begins to become understandable if its vaguely familiar outlines are filled
in. The style is an amalgam of the bureaucratic and the academic.
Although the Court's formulae are not as long or involved as many
administrative rules and guidelines, some of the same characteristics
are plainly evident. 54 Both are complex, layered, and equivocal. Both
employ words in a puzzlingly artificial way. (What, for instance, is a
"nonspeech element"? Why does the Court say that a regulation must
further an "important and substantial" governmental interest?) Typically both attempt to cover all contingencies. (A state law may not
discriminate against interstate commerce "either on its face or in practical effect.") In both an air of authority is established by illusory precision. (The abridgment of speech can be no greater than is
"essential" to furtherance of the governmental interest. But, if inquiry
is directed at how "furthered" the governmental interest must be and
at what cost, the apparent decisiveness in the word "essential"
55
evaporates.)
54. For a description of common characteristics of Legal English, see Danet, Languagein the
Legal Process, 14 LAW & Socy. REv. 445, 469-82 (1980).
55. For another example, see notes 129-31 infra and accompanying text.
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Bureaucratic language is characteristically ridiculed as awkward
and ineffective when read directly by the general public, 56 but it can be
useful when used to achieve cohesion within a profession or control
within official hierarchies. 57 Within organizations, the complexity and
completeness is aimed at preventing predictable efforts at evasion; the
stilted use of words quickly seems normal, as those sharing expertise
and a common working milieu are socialized to understand the words
as terms of art. Delegation of responsibility through the organization
and across time requires systematic delineation and standardization.
The use of bureaucratic style by the Supreme Court is an effort to
achieve similar purposes. To the extent that clerks have substantial
drafting responsibilities and rotate frequently, it saves time to have
established frameworks or recipes for various classes of opinions.
Moreover, in a field where stare decisis is of limited significance and at
a time when there is intense intellectual and ideological diversity at all
levels of the judiciary, the elaborateness and detail of the formulae are
an obvious effort to achieve control and consistency. 5 8 The Court, in
short, has adopted the formulaic style in part because its primary audience is not the general public. It is addressing itself, its clerks, and the
lower courts. The language sounds bureaucratic because the objectives are organizational.
The formulaic style is not, however, fully or only bureaucratic. It
is also academic. The opinions look like law review articles. They
have the same pattern of laborious footnoting and detailed argumentation. They have the same formalized organization - introductions,
major divisions, subdivisions, conclusions. More importantly, like academic writing, opinions analyze endlessly. Ideas, especially as expressed in the formulae, are treated with deadly seriousness: How,
precisely, should a given formula be phrased?59 Should it be applied
56. See Danet, supra note 54, at 450-52, 465-67.

57. Cf id. at 467 (noting the view that while Legal English may be valuable to the legal
profession, it should be avoided when talking with clients).

58. For an arresting account of how Justice Brennan designed doctrine ("[like a diagram
with footprints and arrows") to achieve long-term objectives among other members of the Court,
see Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
59. It has taken, for example, many opinions and years of reflection for the Court to decide

whether in sex discrimination cases the government must show a justification that is "compelling" or "important" or (as it seems now to have decided) "exceedingly persuasive." Compare
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion applying "strict scrutiny"
standard), with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (requiring that gender based classifica-

tions serve "important" governmental objectives), and Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (requiring "exceedingly persuasive justification" to sustain state's gen-

der based classification). Or, to use a different kind of example, when the Court assesses state
regulations that affect interstate commerce, the "appropriate analysis" requires a "strong pre-

sumption" of validity and a "sensitive consideration" of the local safety purpose in relation to the
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60
more generally, be restricted, or perhaps even be abandoned?
Should a single prong (or subprong) be dropped? 61 Should analysis
under one "prong" be merged with analysis under another or kept
63
separate? 62 Are apparently different formulations "really" different?
Indeed, the Court sometimes debates whether a long-used test actually
means anything at allA4 Only academics, one would have thought,
could have such patience for explanation or could so objectify ideas.

One reason the formulaic style is little noticed by commentators is that
it so resembles the voice of the academy.

It is no wonder that opinions have begun to look like legal scholarship, for legal scholars have removed the available alternatives. Formalistic explanations, whether expressed in a short statement of a rule
accompanied by a string of citations65 or in a mechanical restatement
burden on interstate commerce. Much analysis now goes into accommodating "sensitive consideration" with "strong presumptions." See notes 171-73 infra and accompanying text.
60. A debate flourished for a while about whether "strict scrutiny" should be extended to
areas in which "fundamental" interests are affected by limitations on governmental expenditure
programs. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying "strict scrutiny" to
denial of welfare assistance to new state residents), with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (refusing to apply "strict scrutiny" to a statutory ceiling on welfare assistance). Professor
Gunther called this "The 'Fundamental Rights and Interests' Strand of Strict Scrutiny." G.
GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 787 (11th ed. 1985). Other well-known debates about the
appropriate scope of "strict scrutiny" have involved discrimination on the basis of sex, alienage,
and race when used for compensatory purposes. See notes 178-79 infra. Recently, the Court
virtually abandoned any effort to limit the federal commerce power by tenth amendment principles because it was persuaded that the applicable tests were unworkable. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). Currently, there is considerable debate
about whether the establishment clause tests are only "useful" guidelines that ought sometimes
be ignored or are a "settled" and obligatory method of analysis. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1984) (opinion by Burger, C.J., enunciating "unwillingness to be confined
to any single test or criterion"), with Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting, treating
the establishment clause tests as firmly settled).
61. Justice O'Connor, for example, has suggested that the political divisiveness subprong of
"the excessive-entanglement prong of the Lemon test" should be dropped. Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. Compare Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (opinion by Rehnquist, J.,
arguing against "melding" prongs), with Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1048-50 (Powell, J., concurring,
arguing against "bifurcating" prongs).
63. Justice Marshall once argued that the various equal protection tests actually represented
a single, "sliding" scale principle. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 326061 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
64. CompareTrimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-67 (1977) (opinion by Powell, J., stating
that the scrutiny involved in the minimum rationality test as applied to classifications based on
illegitimacy is not "toothless"), with Trimble, 430 U.S. at 780-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, suggesting that the scrutiny applied to classifications based on illegitimacy has been defined insufficiently by the Court).
65. This style associated with formalism is described in K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION 100 (1960). See also G. GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW 62-63
(1977).
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of the relevant text 66, have long been discredited as aridly conceptual-

istic and hopelessly literalistic. But realistic explanations, exemplified
in daringly moralistic ipse dixitS67 or by bald "balancing" tests that
seek to maximize some set of interests, 68 too obviously separate the

Court from its sources of legitimacy. In this age of intellectual anxiety, 69 when judicial power is extended but its bases are more problem-

atic than ever, it is only natural that the Court should imitate its most
skeptical and demanding audience. And, despite vigorous debate

within the academy, the Court has been able to identify among scholars disparate elements of a working consensus on appropriate constitu-

tional explanations. This consensus, which at its best might be
thought to contain the beginnings of a sophisticated instrumental-

ism, 70 is reflected in several aspects of the formulaic style.

First, the formulae are framed as complex explications of the Constitution. 7 1 In insisting that its "tests" have the Constitution as their
ultimate referent the Court seeks to avoid the threat to its legitimacy
inherent in some of the radically subjectivist proposals of the realists
and other skeptics. However, by using multifaceted formulations, the
Court also attempts to avoid some of the familiar critiques of naive

textualism or historicism. The multiple layers of explanation implicitly acknowledge that the task of interpretation is difficult and must
proceed in a way that allows for the simultaneous utilization of vari72
ous sources.
66. For an example, see notes 83-86 infra and accompanying text.
67. Llewellyn said that decisions in the grand style tended to be written simply and with
"pungency." See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 65, at 37.
68. See R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 48, 277 (1982).
69. With both great legal traditions - formalism and realism - having been found wanting,
legal decisions are now made without any settled tradition or philosophical basis. For discussions, see G. GILMORE, supra note 65, ch. 4; Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM.
J.L. HisT. 221, 256 (1980); Hutchinson, From CulturalConstruction to HistoricalDeconstruction
(Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 209, 212 (1984). For a critique of the realists and a tentative
prescription for refinement, see R. SUMMERS, supra note 68.
70. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 68.
71. Although some formulae are related to the Constitution in only the most superficial way,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973), and although formulae tend quickly to substitute
themselves for external constitutional authority, see notes 98-111 infra and accompanying text,
the Court still does generally claim that its doctrines implement values found in the Constitution.
See, eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984) (relating three-part Lemon test to "real
object" of the first amendment). In light of current intellectual ferment over the extent to which
a document can impose constraints on interpretation, this is not as small a point as it might seem.
See, eg., Essays on "The Politics of Legal Interpretation" in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION
249-320 (W. Mitchell ed. 1982); Symposium, Law and Literature,60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 passim
(1982).
72. For example, the standard for evaluating "time, place, and manner" restrictions on
speech involves a principle (content discriminations are prohibited), a utilitarian calculus (the
restriction must serve a significant interest), and an instrumental rule (alternative channels of
communications must be available). See note 3 supra.
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Second, the complexity and detail of formulaic opinions reflect the
Court's felt responsibility to convince. Constitutional answers can no
longer be thought certain and, thus, it is not enough that they simply
be announced. One or more of the prongs is usually openly cast as
instrumental 73 - a concession that the meaning of the Constitution
will vary according to the vagaries of social and political experimentation. The Court labors under a heavy burden of explanation because it
knows it is exercising choice.
Third, the layered "standards" are an effort to create impersonal,
formal rules that can constrain the Court itself. Precisely because the
difficulty of following the rules laid down is now well-known, the
Court resorts to multiple, tentative, self-imposed restrictions. The aspiration is that these rules, once established, are sufficiently clear and
external to the judges to allow for objectivity. 74
Fourth, the formulae apparently allow for moderate fact-responsiveness. The opinions are typically divided into two major sections the first discussing the "prongs" in the abstract and the second applying them to the facts of the case. 75 Moreover, different formulae are
established for fairly narrow classes of cases. 76 The more extreme
realists' proposals that only facts are relevant to the outcome of cases
could never be assimilated into more general notions of lawfulness, but
the Court cannot ignore the power of the attack on abstract, general
legal principles. 77 The form of modem decisions suggests an effort to
moderate (but not abandon) conceptualism by using complex sets of
principles that apply to relevant classes of cases.
In short, the formulaic style reflects a view, aspects of which are
shared among influential legal scholars, that as a practical matter the
advantages of realism can be successfully combined with elements of
formalism. The result is more conceptualistic than the "grand style"
admired by the realists but more elaborate and sophisticated than the
73. See note 72 supra. Other examples include: the requirement that obscenity lack "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," see note 3 supra; the rule that statutes must not
foster "excessive government entanglement" with religion, see note 4 supra; and the calculus for
procedural due process claims, which focuses attention on "the risk of erroneous deprivation of
[the individual's] interest ... and the probable value.., of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards... and the ... burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail," see note 8 supra.
74. I am using the term as Professor Bennett uses it in Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 132

U. PA. L. REv. 445 (1984).
75. See notes 179-81 infra and accompanying text.
76. Formulae are specific to resident aliens who are denied economic benefits, as opposed to
those who are denied membership in the political community, Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S.
432 (1982); to restrictions on "child pornography," as opposed to obscenity, see note 3 supra; to
restrictions on "commercial speech," see note 3 supra; and so on.
77. For a summary, see R. SUMMERS, supra note 68, at 144-47.
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formalism that they discredited. Having seen the judiciary's traditional intellectual habits undercut by decades of legal scholarship, the
Justices have turned to scholarship for substitutes. The academics' analytic style - more explanation, finer distinctions, greater clarity does not inspire but is taken seriously, at least by those whose style is
being imitated. As the Court seeks intellectual legitimacy, the voice of
the judge and the voice of the legal scholar converge.
The elements of this attempted synthesis of formalism and realism
will be evaluated serially in the following sections, which will argue
that the modern style is a superficial and unsatisfactory response to
(admittedly) serious problems. It achieves organizational control and
intellectual respectability, to the extent it does so, by excluding the
general public from the Court's audience and by impoverishing the
Court's thought. A successful accommodation of realism and formalism, if it is possible, would require a style of communication far different from the formulaic style. Perversely, the task would sometimes
require imperfection - evocation, incompleteness, tentativeness, and
even a willingness not to explain. Much may be wrong with older
forms of constitutional doctrine, but in some important respects they
are all superior to the style now so prevalent.
III.

THE EFFORT TO RETAIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE TEXT

Because the modern effort to combine realism and formalism rejects radically subjectivist approaches to interpretation, its constitutional explanations all have a referent outside themselves. Whether
the authority of constitutional law is thought to be grounded in specific text, in the document's history, in the relationship among provisions, or somewhere else, judicial decisions are an effort to
approximate a standard external to the opinion itself. Although all
types of doctrine have the natural effect of substituting themselves for
primary constitutional meaning, 78 formulaic explanations are especially incompatible with maintaining the authority of the original text.
In part, this incompatibility arises because of the formulae's characteristic elaborateness, which reflects an intention to make meaning
clear and certain, but which quickly becomes an end in itself. Words,
for example, are piled on; the repetition, with its own reassuring cadence, is an effort at completion. Thus, the "principal or primary"
effect of a statute must "neither advance nor inhibit" religion; a state
must show that its "purpose or interest" is constitutionally "permissi78. "Doctrine" (in the general sense of reasoning from rules) has the effect, of course, of
focusing attention on itself and thus, as Professor Bobbitt noted, can easily be "severed from the
animating text." P. BOaaTr, supra note 21, at 54-55.
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ble and substantial" or "significant and legitimate"; the means must be
necessary to the "accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of
its interest"; a court must examine "additional or substitute" procedural safeguards. Extra words are so essential to the rhetorical force
of the formulae that they are used, as in the case of the prohibition
against "advancing or inhibiting" religion, even when plainly irrelevant to the constitutional text being interpreted. 79 Occasionally, an
entire clause is added to a formula more for the satisfactory sense of
rounding out that the extra words give than for the addition of any
substantive meaning.80 Formulae sometimes exist in order to explicate
words in other formulae, doctrine to explain doctrine, so the reader is
removed by formal stages from the animating text.81 Strange phrasing, like elaborateness and complexity, fascinates and centers attention
narcissistically around itself. The Justice who argued that the "minimal scrutiny prong of this two-tiered approach has led to an unfortunate diminution of First Amendment protection"8 2 was struggling
against the dead weight of words to get back to the Constitution.
The self-absorption associated with formulae is not an unfortunate
by-product of unnecessary prolixity or complexity. It is a distinctive
purpose of the formulae and is implicit in the basic design. Compare,
for example, naive literalism, which in its most notorious formulation
requires that courts "lay the article of the Constitution... beside the
'8 3
statute... [and] decide whether the latter squares with the former."
79. Although the phrasing is repeated frequently, no one thinks that inhibiting a religion can
cause its establishment. See Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373,
1380 (1981). Such phrases have much in common with the general phenomenon of "doublets"
(the combination of words like "break and enter" or "rules and regulations"). See Danet, supra
note 54, at 469. Doublets originally repeated a thought with a word of a different linguistic
origin so that the phrase could be understood in cultures with multiple languages. Id. The combinations found in modem formulae, whatever their derivation, serve a roughly similar purpose;
they are an attempt to assure understanding by repetition.
80. For example, the Court has removed the possibility of any real significance from the
fourth prong of the test for assessing state taxes on natural resources (that the tax be "fairly
related to the services provided by the State"). See Williams, Severance Taxes andFederalism:
The Role of the Supreme Courtin Preservinga NationalCommon Marketfor Energy Supplies, 53
U. COrO. L. REV.281, 287-89 (1981). It still is carried as part of the formula and has a nice ring
to it.
81. See, for example, the "two-part test" for defining the "political function exception" (to
the "strict scrutiny" standard for assessing discrimination against aliens). Cabell v. ChavezSaido, 454 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1982). See also the "two requirements" used to implement a part
of the middle level of review used in illegitimacy cases. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100
(1982). There is also a formula used to define "excessive sentence," a phrase that is itself part of
a doctrine used to define "cruel and unusual punishment." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92
(1983).
82. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3079 (1984) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
83. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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There is no reason here to review the many difficulties that stand in
the way of comparing words as if they were physical objects. Justice
Roberts' prescription for the judicial role may be impossible but it is
nevertheless helpful. Because under Roberts' apparent assumptions
simple examination of the words is sufficient to determine the issue, his
approach requires the Court to rely on its readers' attention to the
relevant external authority. The decision in which the prescription
was urged, United States v. Butler,84 held that a system of expenditures
for farm price supports was a regulation of agriculture rather than an
expenditure for the general welfare under article I, section 8, and
therefore exceeded congressional power. Because the words "regulation" and "expenditure" are not objects with precise contours, the
Butler opinion could not conclusively - nor did it even persuasively 85
demonstrate why the Agricultural Adjustment Act was one rather
than the other. But the opinion did ask the reader to grapple with the
meaning of words that appear in the Constitution. If the Court's comparison was necessarily incomplete, it was at least palpably incomplete; the deficiencies were there to see for anyone with a common
claim to the English language. Indeed, Justice Roberts did not think
that a conclusive demonstration was possible. He wrote, "All the
Court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon
the question."' 86 The simple announcement of a judgment (no matter
how unsatisfactory in other respects) is generous to the reader, for it
allows room for other judgments.
Some such modesty is necessary in any real appeal to external authority. If in the end a court can do no more than announce its judgment about the meaning of the constitutional text (or other external
authority), that text remains separate from the court's opinion about
it. When a court claims something more ambitious - when it seeks to
demonstrate rather than to announce - there is correspondingly less
reason to distinguish the external authority from the court's opinion.
When the issue is certain and the reader is disallowed an opinion, the
judicial construction comes to be interchangeable with the original
text. Interpretation can then stand in place of the original text.
The disappearance of the external authority is a matter of degree.
To some extent it occurs with any style of explanation. It depends not
so much on the number or strength of the reasons given for a judicial
construction as on the tenor of the rhetorical claims of certainty and
84. 297 U.S. I (1936).

85. 297 U.S. at 78-88 (Stone, J., dissenting).
86. 297 U.S. at 62-63.
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closure made by the court. McCulloch v. Maryland8 7 illustrates both
the varied ways in which these claims can be made and the special
quality of the claim made by use of the formulaic style. In McCulloch
Chief Justice Marshall made a sophisticated literalistic argument that
largely obliterated the original text.8 8 The issue was whether the word
"necessary" in the necessary and proper clause of article I, section 8
was to mean something closer to "merely convenient" than to "absolutely essential." 89 Marshall's argument advanced like an avalanche.
He began by asserting that "nothing is more common than to use
words in a figurative sense." 90 Indeed, "[a]lmost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a
meaning different from that which is obviously intended." 9 1 Having
characterized the use of a word in its simplest and plainest sense as
exceedingly unlikely, Marshall asserted that the figurative meaning "is
'92
essential to just construction.
Marshall then proceeded to draw from a range of sources. In an
audacious argument made to seem entirely obvious, he suggested that
it is logically impossible for a constitution to constrain power narrowly. "To have prescribed the means by which government should,
in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument . . . ,,93 As if this were not
enough, Marshall repeatedly described the "baneful influence" of the
narrower construction on the operations of government. He invoked
"the absolute impracticability of maintaining [the narrower meaning]
without rendering the government incompetent to its great objects ... ,,94 Finally, he claimed that to have used the word "necessary" in a sense other than "convenient" would have been "an
extraordinary departure from the usual course of the human mind." 95
The force of Marshall's argument was created in part by the cumulation of different arguments and in part by the dramatic exaggeration
in his choice of words. He buried the doubting reader under appeals
to common understanding, analogies to the wording of other constitutional provisions, claims about the nature of constitutions, prudential
87. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
88. Professor White made a similar observation about Marshall's argument but explained it

quite differently. See J.WHITE, supra note 33, at 263.
89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413.
90. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414.
91. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414.
92. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414.
93. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.

94. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417-18.
95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 84:165

arguments about the capacities of legislatures to avail themselves of
experience, and assurances about the drafters' intent. The doubter
also had to stand against Marshall's barrage of words: "nothing," "almost all," "obviously," "essential," "impossible," "compelled," "absolute," "conclusively," "extraordinary," and so on. Justice Marshall's
opinion is far more forceful than Justice Roberts'; it is not, however,
more true that "necessary" means "convenient" than that a complex
system of acreage controls is a "regulation" rather than an "expenditure." Marshall's task was not to announce a judgment. His purpose
was to create a fact. To the extent that he was successful - if "necessary" is the same as "convenient" - there is no further reason for the
reader's eye to wander back to the words of the necessary and proper
clause.
Even powerful arguments about particular words, however, can
fail to replace the external text completely. The mere substitution of a
single word for another is precarious; the recalcitrant reader is still left
room to note that the word "convenient" is different from the word
"necessary." Marshall summarized, therefore, not with an argument
but with a complex pronouncement:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the
96
constitution, are constitutional.
Almost nothing in McCulloch presaged the complexity and ambiguity
of this passage. The thrust of all the arguments had been that the
necessary and proper clause enlarged Congress' power and permitted
the use of any means it thought useful. The pronouncement, however,
suggested that courts should decide whether the means chosen are
"appropriate" and whether they are "plainly adapted" to their ends.
These words seem to reintroduce the narrower (and emphatically rejected) meaning of "necessary," and the restriction that the means
must be consistent with "the letter and spirit of the constitution" is
potentially a broad one indeed.
Despite the equivocation, the reader remains untroubled, carried
along by the uncompromising power of the preceding arguments. In
fact, .the passage successfully completed the process of substitution for
the original text because it had a substantive, finished quality. One
word was not replaced by another. One word was replaced by a systematic inquiry, a series of standards that seem complete and authoritative. In the end the force of McCulloch does not lie in its persuasive
interpretation of an external authority. It lies in its obliteration of its
96. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
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reader's attention to external authority and in its substitution of promised, announced judicial inquiries for that authority.
Chief Justice Marshall's summarizing passage is an eerie precursor
of the modern formulaic style. Today the passage would be written
without the magisterial tone but otherwise would be little changed. It
might look like this:
Legislation under the necessary and proper clause is sufficiently justified
if: (1) the purpose is legitimate and within the scope of the constitution;
(2) the means chosen are appropriate or plainly adapted to that purpose;
(3) the means are not specifically or impliedly prohibited.
The changes suggest increased formalization. Each "prong" is numbered, and it is both necessary and sufficient to satisfy all three. Each
of Marshall's clauses has become more emphatically a hurdle in its
own right. Together they are more woodenly but more plainly what
Marshall intended them to be: a doctrine, a legally effective text
rather than an imperfect description of something else.
The rhetorical end point of the McCulloch opinion - the replacement of external authority - has in recent years become the customary beginning point of constitutional decisions. The prevalence of the
formulaic style makes routine what Marshall's opinion worked so
hard toward. Indeed, today the problematic opinion is the one that
does not stand in the place of the Constitution. Modem dissatisfaction
with incomplete closure is illustrated by the sad history of the Court's
effort to define state sovereignty as an affirmative limitation on the
commerce power.
In a much discredited, and now formally overruled 97 decision, the
Court in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery98 struck down the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to most state and local
employees. The decision, notable for its tentative and uncompleted
quality, was an unusual departure from the formulaic style. It began
by identifying its external referents as a general principle ("our federal
system of government") and a specific text (the tenth amendment). 9 9
The rest of the opinion consisted of unstructured but suggestive examples, analogies, contrasts, and phrases. This groping discussion began
with the sensible but limited assertion that Congress may not impair a
state's "'ability to ftmction effectively in a federal system.' ,,o The
Court proceeded to analogize the FLSA to taxes on a state's capitol,10 1
97. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

99. 426 U.S. at 842.
100. 426 U.S. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).

101. 426 U.S. at 843.
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without explaining how such taxes might impair this "ability." It then
referred to "the essential role of the States in our federal system," 10 2
and proceeded quickly to distinguish federal regulation of private persons from regulation of "States as States." 1 03 In the remainder of the
opinion, the Court repeated and supplemented the illustrations (again
distinguishing private behavior' °4 and adding an analogy to the states'
power to locate their own capitals' 0 5). And without especially building on them, it piled on more phrases: 106 an "undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty," functions that are "essential to [the states'] separate
and independent existence," "a coordinate element in the system established by the Framers," "traditional aspects of state sovereignty,"
interference "with the integral governmental functions," and so on.
While more functional than literal, the argument in National
League of Cities has much in common with Justice Roberts' opinion in
United States v. Butler. Just as Butler did not attempt a definitive description of a "regulation," National League of Cities began but did
not at all complete a description of "state sovereignty." Both decisions are a series of gestures that leave the reader with the ultimate
judgment about an authority that remains distinct from the Court's
opinion. Although annoying to scholars, the unclosed and tentative
quality in National League of Cities itself attests to the effort in the
opinion to get at an external constitutional standard. The phrases and
examples indicate - point to - but do not replace.
Within a few years, what was unformed and indicative in National
League of Cities became formulaic and self-referenced:
[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid... must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there
must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as
States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are
indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And third, it must be
apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of tradi10 7
tional governmental functions."'
Despite superficial similarities between this formula and the phrases
that appear in National League of Cities, systemization utterly
changed the nature of the constitutional interpretation. What had
102. 426 U.S. at 844.
103. 426 U.S. at 845.
104. 426 U.S. at 847.
105. 426 U.S. at 845 (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
106. 426 U.S. at 845, 849, 851.
107. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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been an effort to explain the principle of federalism became a substitute for it. Under the formula, a statute that failed to satisfy any one
of the prongs would be constitutional. Under NationalLeague of Cities, because the phrases are proxies for the external idea of the states'
capacity to function effectively in the federal system, a devastating
blow to any factor relevant to that standard might render the statute
in question unconstitutional. The illustrations used in National
League of Cities clearly demonstrate this, for they do not involve violations of all the elements later extracted from the opinion. For example, the Court noted that the national government may not control the
placement of a state capital. 10 8 Controlling this location does involve
the state "as a State"; perhaps, but not "indisputably," this decision
(like the adoption of legislation) is an attribute of state sovereignty;
once the capital is located, the ability of a state to structure integral
operations, whether in traditional or nontraditional areas, is not necessarily affected.
It is logically possible and not inconsistent with NationalLeague of
Cities that a now unimagined federal statute might violate none of the
three requirements of the subsequently developed formula and yet
present a serious threat to the capacity of the states to function as
governments. For example, suppose a federal statute preempted all
state regulatory power over any issue susceptible to regulation under
the commerce power except for state activities themselves. 10 9 This
statute would not violate any of the requirements;' 10 yet such a broadscale withdrawal of regulatory power from the states might seriously
threaten their capacity to govern. 1" The interposition of formal doctrine would block serious consideration of this issue. The analogies,
comparisons, and aphorisms of NationalLeagueof Cities, on the other
hand, while intellectually unfashionable, would permit analysis of the
unexpected variation because they do not substitute themselves for the
external constitutional issue.
Although cases that use formulae sometimes state that the doctrine
is only a starting point for resolving the ultimate issue, 1 2 the rhetori108. 426 U.S. at 845 (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
109. This is a position similar to one that Chief Justice Marshall once considered reading
into the Constitution itself, although at a time when the commerce power seemed more confined.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
110. See note 107 supra and cases cited therein.
111. In the Federalists' theory, general regulatory power was essential to a state's capacity to
act as a governmental "counterpoise" to the national government. See Nagel, Federalism as a
Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. Rnv. 81, 102-05.
112. See, for example, the discussion of Lynch v. Donnelly in note 60 supra. See also Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983) (factors "may be helpful" or "useful").
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cal force of the formulae - their systematic, finished quality - is
inconsistent with such assurances. If unexpected facts in new cases do
not seem sensibly resolvable under an established formula, attention
does not easily shift back to the external constitutional issue. At the
extreme, a wholly different formula (also self-contained and completed) might be established for a class of cases ' 13 or, as occurred with
efforts to define state sovereignty, the ultimate constitutional inquiry
might simply be abandoned.1 1 4 When doctrine becomes an end in itself, either some perfected formula must stand in place of external authority or that authority must be nullified.
IV. THE EFFORT TO PERSUADE
Modern judicial opinions aim somewhere between the revealed
certainties of formalism and the highly personalized flats of extreme
realism. If in part the Constitution means what judges want it to
mean, the Court is obliged to attempt to convince others that its
choices are desirable. Thus the formulaic style seems designed to clarify and convince. Each issue is given wholly separate formulation and
discussion. Every shading of understanding is given explicit treatment
in separate opinions. Nearly any criticism or doubt is sufficiently important to deserve a reply, if only in a footnote. The modern Court's
burden is neither simply to reveal nor even to explain; it is to enlist the
volition of others. Persuasion in this sense requires an unconstrained
audience and a responsible speaker, for common volition is impossible
without both. Unfortunately, the rhetorical force of the formulaic
style is consistent with neither.
Persuasion is always an effort to make the listener feel compelled
to a certain conclusion. However, most forms of persuasion create a
sense of constraint by first addressing an independent audience; such
arguments begin in the readers' terrain and move from there, always
acknowledging the importance of their understanding and assent. 115
Accordingly, most forms of judicial explanation depend for their force
on the communicative power of common language. Even highly formalistic opinions depend, in their literalism, upon conventional understanding.1 16 That is why such opinions frequently rely heavily on
113. As has happened, for example, several times with sex discrimination cases. Compare
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) ("rational relationship" standard for gender based classifications), with note 59 supra and cases cited therein ("strict scrutiny" and "intermediate scrutiny"
applied to gender based classifications in different cases).
114. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); see also
note 5 supra.
115. See Danet, supra note 54, at 508-09.
116. At one time an effort was made to link creativity in the common law to custom and
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synonyms and antonyms. In Carterv. CarterCoal Co., 117 for instance,
the Court tried to explain the difference between "direct" and "indirect" effects on commerce in this way: "The word 'direct' implies that
the activity or condition... shall operate proximately - not mediately, remotely, or collaterally - to produce the effect." 8 The additional words can help persuade if they match some existing
understanding. Similarly, analogies are used to make the unintuitive
seem familiar. Thus in Butler the Court tried to explain how an expenditure could be a regulation by emphasizing the similarity between
the binding quality of a contractual "obligation" and the authoritative
quality of a regulation. 1 9 Metaphors like the "throat" of commerce 20 and the "current" of commerce' 2 ' are also efforts to appeal
to common experience and perceptions. Despite their reputation for
sterility, formalistic opinions appeal to the linguistic community as
authority.
In different degrees, the same is true of other forms of explanation.
The modem "balancing test," for example, typically involves the specification of a series of factors and the announcement that, after weighing them, the Court has reached a certain conclusion. Whatever its
deficiencies and despite its different parentage, this form of explanation appeals to common experience in almost the same way that formalism does. The listing of various considerations, like the use of
synonyms or metaphors, calls upon everyday experience. Like the recitation of plain words, the recitation of the factors in the balance can
convince a reader whose experiences and understandings are coordinate with the judges'. Both forms stop short of demonstration because
both assume that little need be said when much is shared.
To a lesser extent, Chief Justice Marshall's grand pronouncements,
popular consent. See M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
18-23 (1977). Formalism was often pictured as obscure, nonintuitive, elitist, and pseudo-scientific. Under this view, "laymen's reasoning [is separated] from professional reasoning" in order
to hide the connection between law and politics. Id. at 256-59. Today, however, there is strong
reason to identify reformers and realists as those who rely on a scientific overlay to protect their
power. See G. GILMORE, supra note 65, ch. 4 (1977) (suggesting this connection); see also B.
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (illustrating the connection). At any
rate, Professor Bobbitt is surely right that literalistic arguments "rest on a sort of ongoing social
contract, whose terms are given their contemporary meanings continually ...." P. BOBBrrr,
supra note 21, at 26. He notes that two great textualists, Justices Black and Story, believed that
common understandings, rather than recondite meanings or superior learning, should control

textual interpretations. Id.
117. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
118. 298 U.S. at 307.

119. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1936).
120. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922).

121. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905).
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described earlier, 122 depend in part on the warrant of common usage.123 Justice Holmes' famous aphorism allowing restriction of only
that speech that involves a "clear and present danger" has had endur-

ing influence largely because it came paired with its famous example
from ordinary life. 124 Justice Brandeis' lyrical concurrence in Whitney

v. Californiawas, despite its reference to the opinions of "those who
won our independence," transparently an appeal to his readers' impulses toward courage and tolerance. 12 5 The most persuasive passage
in Brown v. Board of Education, a decision notable for its simplicity,
called up what was already commonly known and felt: "To separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their
12 6
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'
The form of explanation that least appeals to the audience as an
independent authority is the formulaic style, which does not so much

move its readers as disqualify them. The phrasing of the formulae
122. See notes 87-96 supra and accompanying text.
123. This theme is fully developed in J. WHrrE, supra note 33, at 247-63.
124. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theatre and causing a panic.... The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger ....
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citation omitted).
125. Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They
believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies ....
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant
men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the
processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion.
274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted) (overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)); cf L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
126. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The Court also referred to social science evidence concerning
detrimental educational effects, thus illustrating the unfortunate modem compulsion to rely on
something other than common experience and understanding. It is this compulsion that finds its
current expression in the artificial language of the formulaic style.
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often creates a specious sense of certainty. There are no "indisputable" attributes of state sovereignty 127 nor is any particular method
ever "essential" to furthering a state's interest.'2 8 Similarly, words
common in the formulae - "directly," "apparent," "incidental,"
"sufficiently," "substantial," "excessive," and so on - promise clarity
or measurement where only judgment is possible. The second
"prong" of the establishment clause test, for instance, asks whether
the statute's "principal or primary" effect is to advance religion. The
Court in Meek v. Pittenger found that the loan of secular instructional
aids to religious schools violated this standard, despite the existence of
the secular legislative purpose of developing children's intellectual capacities. 129 Of course, any aid to parochial schools has the effect of
advancing religion, but what does it mean to say that the principal
effect of providing maps and laboratory equipment is religious? As the
Court acknowledged, a school does not cease to be educational because it instills religious values, and a map does not "change in use" to
a religious tract.130 The Court's answer was to emphasize the degree
to which parochial schools integrate secular and religious education,
so that educational assistance "inescapably" advanced religion.' 3 '
This answer only emphasized the problematic nature of the Court's
announced inquiry. If a school were to achieve perfect identity between its religious and educational functions, aid of any kind could not
- by definition - be said to advance one aspect more than the other.
The use of the words "principal or primary," then, lent the Court's
discussion the authority of measurement but not its substance. Indeed, nothing in the opinion explained why the measured effect of the
aid was greater on the religious function than on the educational function. Nor would this measurement have been of much relevance, since
an aid program could be dangerous to constitutional values whether or
not its educative effects were marginally greater than its tendency to
advance religion. Words like "principal or primary" must be read as
efforts to explain why the religious effects were especially important or
threatening. The metaphor of measurement added only deceptive pre127. See note 107 supra and accompanying text. It is almost indisputable that states should
continue to exist. But see Tushnet, supra note 25, at 800 n.54.
128. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. In United States v. O'Brien itself the Court
described the prohibition against burning draft cards as essential to certain governmental interests, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968), but these interests might have been satisfied as well by a requirement that draft boards be notified promptly upon destruction and that a self-addressed,
stamped envelope be enclos~d to assure prompt replacement.

129. 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975).
130. 421 U.S. at 365-66.
131. 421 U.S. at 365-66.
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cision, preventing the reader from participating fully in the matter of
judgment that was actually at issue.
The prongs themselves are frequently impervious to common understanding - a specialized code directed at the initiated rather than
an explanation directed to the governed. The first part of the test for
enforcing the establishment clause, for example, assumes the possibility of a unitary legislative intention, 132 which is a possibility that anyone passingly familiar with even one person's motivational structure
would think so unlikely as to be unworthy of inquiry. The same test's
second prong involves identifying the primary effect of legislation; but
the Court, while openly acknowledging that the consequences are the
same, has enforced the rule by differentiating between direct subsidies
to parents and tax deductions. Whatever the Court means by "primary effect," it is not what most people would expect. 133 Under the
third prong, which asks whether there is "excessive government entanglement with religion," the Court puzzlingly inquires about the
amount of political debate engendered by a statute.1 34 The "rational
basis test" states that a statute is void if it serves no legitimate purpose
at all, a possibility that would only occur to someone in a fever (or to a
judge who in fact meant something else).1 35 For many years now the
Court, apparently using the phrase "potential life" to mean "actual
life," has insisted that the state's interest in the potential life of the
fetus is somehow less in the second trimester than in the third.1 36 The
requirement that a state tax "be fairly related to the services provided
by the State" does not, as a normal reader would expect, measure the
amount of the tax in relation to the value of the services actually provided by the tax; instead it requires merely that the tax be related to
the extent of the contact of the taxed party with the state. 137 In each
of these instances, the Court's tests are difficult and obscure not be132. The Court found that a city's creche served the secular functions of celebrating the
Christmas holiday and depicting its origins. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984). As to
the possibility that the city might have had other purposes, the Court commented that "all that
Lemon requires" is that there be "a secular purpose." 465 U.S. at 681 n.6 (citation omitted).
Thus, only a wholly religious purpose would violate the "secular purpose" test.
133. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 n.6 (1983) (distinguishing Committee for Pub.

Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)). For fuller discussion, see notes 129-

31 supra and accompanying text.
134. For a criticism, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
135. See note 64 supra.
136. A point made forthrightly by Justice O'Connor in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459-61 (1983) (dissenting opinion).

137. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1981). For an insightful discussion, see Williams, supra note 80, at 287-89.
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cause the language is legalistic or technical but simply because the
Court uses words in an unusual and often wholly unrealistic way.
In other instances, the artificiality is less obvious but still undermines the capacity of the Court's doctrines to serve as vehicles of communication. It is not possible to know, for example, whether
"alternative means" might equally well promote a valid local purpose
"without discriminating against interstate commerce. ' 138 The failure
in a particular instance to imagine the alternative that satisfies this
requirement is no proof that further effort might not yield one. Nor is
it possible to know whether a governmental interest is "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression."' 39 In every case in which expression is restricted, that restriction is the means by which the valid governmental objective is achieved; thus it would always be strange to say
that the objective is "unrelated" to the suppression. The use of tests
that cannot mean what they say does not necessarily foreclose useful
judicial inquiry, but it does involve indirection and artificiality that
exclude the reader.
As important as the words is the shape of the formulae. Their
design suggests that all the relevant issues have been identified, separated, and answered. The doctrine is comprehensive and definitive.
Only one answer can emerge from the machine. The vitriolic exchanges among the Justices that are becoming customary' 4° are not
merely evidence of ideological cleavages. They result from the same
excessive pursuit of certainty that is reflected in the form of modern
doctrine. When only one answer is possible, disagreement even among
members of the Court is treated as a sign of irresponsibility or obduracy. A fortiori, the formulaic style forecloses independent judgment
by the wider publics that are affected by the decisions but that have no
special claims to understanding or authority.
To establish common volition, the Court must not only permit the
participation of the reader but also must acknowledge the responsibility of the speaker. Because legal traditions generally deny the creative
component of the choices made by judges, most forms of explanation
obscure the speaker at least as a matter of appearances. Legal author138. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
140. Examples, of course, are legion, but this one serves to illustrate the point: In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that an alienage classification was not "suspect" and
should be tested only by the rationality standard. Under this standard, the state's purpose was
"surely" legitimate and the classification's rationality "evident." Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 39,
47 (1982). In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun labeled Justice Rehnquist's argument on
suspect classifications "simplistic to the point of caricature" and "preposterous." 458 U.S. at 20,
23. Justice Blackmun thought that all alienage cases had been decided consistently with a single
principle. 458 U.S. at 21.
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ity - whether a case, a principle, rule, or the words of a test - always
describes the judge's felt sense of constraint. Even the modem balancing test, in which the judge most plainly relies on private assessments
and values, is expressed by the metaphor of weighing, as if the judge
were a set of scales rather than a person actively deciding. But the
judge's own voice can often break through from beneath the surface.
It can be heard in Justice Roberts' tired admission that all a court can
do is "announce its considered judgment." 14 1 Most frequently it is
heard in the urgency and emotion that a judge allows into the opinion
in the power of the words, in the cadence, in the massing of arguments. Whether the tone is that of prophet, royalty, accountant, or
weary soul, judicial opinions traditionally permit glimmers of the
judges' view of themselves and of their responsibility.
The tone of the formulaic style, however, is distinctively mechanical. 142 Its operative metaphor is the observer. The opinions describe
the performance of contestants, not the judgment of the Court. One
side's position does not "pass muster," 14 3 "fail[s]" a test, 144 "fare[s]"
badly,1 45 "runs afoul" of a standard, 14 6 or does not get over a hurdle.1 47 The words of the doctrines are so carefully selected 14 8 because
they will "yield" 149 the results in case after case. Everything turns on
whether the state's interest must be "legitimate," or "important," or
"compelling." Worlds evolve around the difference between a "reasonable relationship" and a "substantial relationship," or between
"pure" speech and "mixed" speech. Such words are divided neatly
into separate sections, and the relationship among the sections is explicitly established. All this precision is an attempt to achieve one effect: that the words, once in place, will do the work as the judges
watch, recording the score.
141. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936); see note 86 supra and accompanying text.

142. Although an extreme example, here is an entire discussion of whether an ad valorem
personal property tax on imported goods being stored for shipment violated the "dormant" commerce clause:
Nor do I find merit in appellant's constitutional arguments. Appellees' taxes do not
violate the Commerce Clause, as they are "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, [are] fairly apportioned, [do] not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [are] fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, Tex., 459 U.S. 145, 157 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. The phrase is from Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982).
144. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973).
145. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785 (1973).
146. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 258 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
147. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983).
148. See note 59 supra.
149. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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The formulaic style strains hard, too hard, to convince. By disqualifying the reader and by reducing the judge to observer, it achieves
a false definiteness rather than persuasive power.
V.

THE EFFORT TO CONSTRAIN

It has become increasingly common to justify judicial enforcement
of constitutional norms on the surprising ground that judges are at
least somewhat constrained by impersonal standards.1 5 0 The argument is surprising because it is so modest. It divorces authoritativeness from legitimacy. A precedent that misconstrues the
constitutional text but is nevertheless capable of constraining future
judges is impersonal and, therefore, is thought to legitimize judicial
power.15 1 Moreover, objectivity is compatible with some amount of
unconstrained choice; it contemplates only some "boundary" on
choice and thus is vague as to the amount of judicial discretion that is
acceptable.1 52 Since the behavior of most, if not all, government officials is responsive (in some degree) to external constraints, the emphasis on objectivity as a justification for judicial power hardly
distinguishes judges from anyone other than the pure tyrant who is
able to govern by personal whim.
Despite its weakness as a justification, the idea of objectivity is essential to the modern effort to accommodate realism and formalism.
Current practice is too sophisticated to rely on the capacity of the
judge to find a single, authoritative interpretation of constitutional
text, yet it is too wedded to the ideal of the rule of law to permit judges
to operate beyond legal constraint. Therefore, the formulaic style is
designed to extract the maximum possible force from objectivity. In
modem decisions, judges are bound not merely by simple and undefined maxims nor by the mysterious flux of prior cases, but by rules
that are specific and multiple. The doctrines that in fact largely supplant constitutional text must be sufficiently detailed and schematic to
bind judges who otherwise might seem beyond the law.
The apparent definiteness of the formulae does help to convey a
promise of impersonal constraint. This is so, however, only because
precision involves (or seems to involve) the possibility of checking a
court's judgment against some identifiable, agreed-upon standard
150. See, eg., Bennett, supra note 74; Dworkin, Law as Interpretationand My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Any More, in THE
POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 249, 287, supra note 71; Fiss, supra note 38.
151. Bennett, supra note 74, at 447; Fiss, supra note 38, at 773.
152. Bennett, supra note 74, at 458; Dworkin, supra note 150, at 304; Fiss, supra note 38, at
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other than the judge's own inclinations. Most forms of constitutional
explanation have this capacity not because of their internally systematic character, but because of their persuasiveness as an interpretation
of constitutional text. That text provides an appeal against which any
later change in construction can be measured. For example, in his
famous treatment of the question whether a state could tax an activity
of a federal bank, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the issue could be
resolved by a principle "blended with... [the] texture" of the Constitution: "This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws
made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by
them." 15 3 This pronouncement purports to be a direct explanation,
almost a restatement, of constitutional provisions. The passage speaks
with enormous authority, not so much because it states a rule that is
itself capable of constraining judges, but because it is a forceful statement of what the text requires. It is the persuasiveness of the interpretation that promises constraint in the future.
Even a decision that uses no principles or rules - a decision that
depends upon argument from the facts of the case rather than any
formal, encapsulated statements - can convey the possibility of some
objectivity if it is the external text to which the opinion appeals. Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority 154 is a well-known and extreme
illustration. The case involved the question whether the actions of a
privately owned coffee shop located within a public parking garage
were actions of the "state" for purposes of applying the strictures of
the fourteenth amendment. The decision relied on a detailed recitation of facts:' 55 the public purposes of the garage were subsidized by
renting to the restaurant; in some respects the conduct of the restaurant was controlled by a lease; the garage had signs and flags indicating its public character; the building's acquisition and maintenance
costs were paid out of public funds. Having massed these and other
facts, the Court concluded:
The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [the coffee shop] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in
the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to
have been so "purely56private" as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
153. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819).
154. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
155. 365 U.S. at 717-20.
156. 365 U.S. at 725.
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By modem standards, the extraordinary aspect of the Court's opinion
was its refusal to formalize its reasoning into principles:
Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the conclusions drawn from... this record are by no means declared as universal truths on the basis of which every state leasing agreement is to be
tested.... [A] multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall
only
within the Amendment's embrace, but that.., can be determined
157
in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present.
The Court's unwillingness to state explicit formulations was criticized
as a failure of objectivity; the absence of rules was seen as a refusal to
constrain future decisions. 158 And, indeed, the Court's own summation of what it had decided in Burton appeared to promise only that
future cases with identical facts would be decided in the same way. 159
The failure to formalize a rule in Burton, however, did not fatally
undermine the capacity of the decision to constrain judges in future
cases. To the extent that the Court's arguments persuasively related
the facts of the case to the "state action" requirement, Burton was, as
later cases demonstrate, 160 pregnant with possibilities for influencing
the Justices in subsequent decisions. After all, the Burton Court did
not merely list facts; it used facts to argue about constitutional meaning. It argued that the state ought not benefit financially or programmatically from discriminatory policies; 161 it suggested that the
purposes of the fourteenth amendment were implicated when private
actions were perceived by the public as state action; 162 it claimed a
practical policy against permitting easy evasion by the state of its constitutional obligations.1 63 To the extent that Burton was persuasive in
these respects, its attention to particularized facts was rich and emphatic, certainly more so than a mechanically stated rule. In short, in
Burton objectivity (or the capacity to constrain) did not depend on the
precision of verbal formulations but on the continuing persuasive
power of the complex marshaling of facts.
157. 365 U.S. at 725-26.
158. E.g., Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority -A
COLUM. L. Rav. 1458 (1961).

Case Without Precedent, 61

159. 365 U.S. at 726.
160. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 366 (1974); Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 564 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972);

United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966);
Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 137 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267, 274 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247
(1963); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353 (1962); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369
U.S. 84, 89 (1962).
161. 365 U.S. at 724-25.
162. 365 U.S. at 725.

163. 365 U.S. at 725.
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In constrast, the formulaic constitution is a series of judicial demands. The Court refers to the subparts of its formulations as "tests,"
"requirements," and even "hurdles." One side "must satisfy" each of
three requirements; 164 a party "must show"; 165 or "it must be apparent that .... ,"166 The possibility of impersonal constraint is belied by
the explicit and reiterated demand that the judge be addressed and
satisfied. Occasionally discretionary power is openly acknowledged.
The burden on the government in sex discrimination cases is to show
"'atleast that the classification serves 'important . . . objectives and
that the... means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' 167 Fulfilling the announced requirements
might, the test itself announces, not always be sufficient. The Court
sometimes describes apparently definitive formulae as "helpful" or as
mere "guidelines." 1 68 Although the careful design and elaborate
structure of the formulae assign to the words the responsibility for the
outcome, in various ways the phrasing emphasizes that the judge has
the power to give (or not to give) the words meaning.
Even the structured and finished quality of the formulae work
against their capacity to communicate constraint to either judge or
reader. Like the language itself, the complex structure of the formulae
emphasizes the need to persuade the judge and, therefore, subtly highlights the power inherent in applying or altering the hurdles. For example, because they are designed to be complete and precise, formulae
often separate issues that are roughly similar. Thus the formulations
1 69
are characterized by a redundant or, at least, overlapping quality.
The systemizations of state sovereignty that followed NationalLeague
of Cities, for instance, demanded that the state demonstrate both regulation of the states "as states" and impairment of states' "ability to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 70 To the uninitiated the impairment of integral operations
would necessarily involve regulation of the states "as states." The two
prongs are not, however, identical: "to regulate" is not necessarily "to
164. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.

165. E.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
166. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
167. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (emphasis added)
(quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
168. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) ("useful" but the Court will not "be

confined to any single test or criterion"); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983) ("may be
helpful," "may find it useful"); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) ("not ... precise
limits... but.., only... guidelines").
169. For a description of one example of redundancy, see Williams, supra note 80, at 288.
170. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981); see
note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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impair"; and the state could be regulated "as a state" in a nontraditional area. Nevertheless, the complete separation of two such closely
related sets of issues emphasizes their cumulative, hurdle-like quality.
The litigant must jump and then jump again.
Formal separation of overlapping rules communicates discretionary power in other ways as well. Systematic formulation of doctrine
makes the Court's use of inconsistent propositions stand out, and compartmentalized analysis provides abundant opportunities for the Court
to exploit such inconsistencies. In applying the "dormant" commerce
clause in Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp. to state truck-length
regulations, for instance, a plurality of the Court summarized the relevant "general principles" as follows:
[A] State's power to regulate commerce is never greater than in matters
traditionally of local concern.... [R]egulations that touch upon safety
- especially highway safety - are those that "the Court has been most
reluctant to invalidate." . . . Indeed, "if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their
importance in comparison with ...burdens on interstate commerce."
But [the Court will weigh] "... the asserted safety purpose against
the degree of interference with interstate commerce" . . . [by means ofl
"a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulaextent of the burden imposed on the course of
tory concern in light of17the
1
interstate commerce."
The reader is thus put on notice that the Court retains the option
either to defer to or to second-guess the legislative judgment. The remainder of the plurality opinion insisted on appearing to exercise both
these choices. In one section, it found that the state's safety interest
was inadequate, despite acknowledging evidence demonstrating at
least some safety considerations behind the statute.172 Dismissing this
evidence, of course, could be read as "second-guessing" the legislative
judgment. This possibility seems confirmed by a later, separate section, where the plurality argued that "special deference" to the state's
safety judgment was inappropriate because the local regulation placed
disproportionate burdens on out-of-state businesses. 173 However, the
language of the section that discussed the safety rationale purported to
be the language of deference. The state had "failed to present any
persuasive evidence," and its safety interest was "illusory." 17 4 Moreover, the question whether the burdens on commerce were dispropor171. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981).

172. 450 U.S. at 671.
173. 450 U.S. at 675-76.
174. 450 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added).
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tionate to the safety benefits was the legislative judgment that the
plurality had asserted would not be second-guessed unless the safety
interests were essentially nonexistent. So, one might think, an exacting inquiry into safety considerations could not have been triggered by
a balancing process that itself was triggered by the finding that safety
interests were illusory. The justification for discounting the evidence
on safety, then, remains somewhat mysterious despite the later discussion on the inappropriateness of special deference. Perhaps some Talmudic distinction could resolve the confusion, but rhetorically at least
the opinion blithely insisted on having it both ways: it did and did not
second-guess the legislative judgment.
In offering the Court opportunities to treat related issues repetitively, multiple "prongs" permit the Court to treat closely related issues differently under different headings. Consider again the cases in
which the Court has found that state aid to private schools was motivated by the secular legislative purpose of improving education but
had the primary effect of advancing religion. 175 While to most people
this combination of findings would be surprising, it is not formally
inconsistent. The intended purpose of the program need not turn out
to be its main consequence. Nevertheless, the issues of institutional
motivation and primary effect are closely related, if only because intent is normally inferred from consequences. Compartmentalizing the
discussions of motive and effect allowed the Court to characterize the
program both benignly and harshly. 176 The effect of, at once, exculpating the legislators and condemning the program is to drive home to
the reader the extent to which the nature of the program can be
viewed in different ways, thus emphasizing the range of choices available to the Court.
Despite their superficial precision, neither the content nor the
shape of modern formulae communicates clarity and constraint. The
formulae are demands - multiple, repetitive, shifting, and sometimes
inconsistent demands. The style reflects intellectual embarrassment
about the existence ofjudicial discretion but is designed to assure plentiful opportunities for its exercise. In combination with the mechanical tone of formulaic opinions,1 77 the palpable range of choice inherent
175. E.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
176. Compare Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975) (Court accepts "legislative findings that the welfare of the Commonwealth requires that present and future generations of
schoolchildren be assured ample opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities" and that the
statute was intended to extend "the benefits of free educational aids to every schoolchild"), with
Meek, 421 U.S. at 365-66 ("[Massive aid provided the church-related nonpublic schools.., is
neither indirect nor incidental... [and] inescapably results in the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity .... ").
177. See notes 127-49 supra and accompanying text.
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in the formulae communicates, not objectivity, but power without responsibility. Rather than binding, the formulaic style frees the Court,
like some lumbering bully, to disrupt social norms and practices at its
pleasure.
VI.

THE EFFORT TO MODERATE CONCEPTUALISM

The modem style uses intermediate principles in an attempt to

combine conceptualism with fact-responsiveness. Despite the arguments of the realists, abstract constitutional principles cannot be re-

duced to circumstantial factual judgments. But the dangers of
conceptualism are now too well understood to permit decisions by reference to a few abstract legal principles. The Court's middle ground is
to emphasize analysis of how subclasses of cases should be resolved.
Overarching principles like equal protection are broken down into
three or more sets of formulae, and the Court expends large parts of its
effort and creativity in deciding which formula should govern a moderately specific category of fact situations. More than a decade of
opinions has been spent on many of these issues. 17 8 In particular
cases, the contrast between the space and energy devoted to selecting
doctrine and that devoted to applying doctrine is frequently striking. 179 Throughout modem constitutional law - from first amendment questions about obscenity 8 0 to commerce clause issues arising
from state regulation of truck lengths 8" - much of the Justices' intellectual energy is not directed at the actual resolution of cases at hand.
178. The modem Court's effort to design the proper test for sex discrimination cases dates
from 1971, and significant refinements were still being made in 1982. Compare Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), with Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). See notes
59 & 113 supra. Similar time has been devoted to alienage. Compare Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971), with Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984). Nearly a decade was spent
defining state sovereignty, and renewed efforts are likely. Compare National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), with Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct.
1005 (1985). The tinkering with the tests for obscenity went on between 1957 and 1973. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),
and Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. The Court needed 13 years to decide what standard of review should govern alienage
discrimination cases. Then in Bernal v. Fainter(a case involving discrimination against aliens in
laws governing notary publics) the Court spent more than four pages on doctrine selection and
less than a single page - in fact, one paragraph - in applying the doctrine to the case. 467 U.S.
216 (1984). Only a few years earlier, in a similar case, the Court spent almost nine pages on
doctrine selection and a half page in application. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). After
decades of reliance on the "minimum rationality" test the Court in 1977 spent more than six
pages on the test and less than a page in applying it. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
For other examples, see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324-79 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
180. See note 178 supra.
181. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
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It is directed at the difficult, complex, but preliminary issue of determining the proper test to be applied in a defined class of cases.
This
painstaking and self-conscious attention to preliminary and moderately abstract questions reflects and enhances a perspective that is regulatory, abstract, and adversarial.
A.

The Regulatory Perspective

The first of the consequences arises because the vigor and seriousness of the argumentation about choice of doctrine stands in such distinct contrast to the mechanical tone of judicial application of
doctrine. This contrast emphasizes the personal responsibility of
judges at the level of policy determination. Although the doctrine determines the outcome (as the judges watch),1 82 the Justices do take
responsibility for the precise wording and relationships within the formulae. 18 3 What is communicated, then, is that the important part of
the modem Justice's task is deciding how sets of problems should be
handled. This acceptance of responsibilityfor choosing the words casts
the Court as a regulator rather than as an adjudicator. Thus the shape
of the opinions emphasizes a relocation of the judges' moral responsibility and a redefinition of their institutional role.
Paradoxically, more general legal pronouncements - such as Justice Marshall's maxim that the federal rule must never be controlled
by the state rule, or Justice Holmes' principle that all free speech questions can be resolved by reference to the "clear and present danger"
test - are so broad that necessarily they channel judicial effort to an
assessment of the particularities of the case. 184 Similarly, the analogical thinking characteristic of case analysis forces comparison and evaluation of relevant facts in cases. 1 8 5 Balancing, too, explains so little
that its major consequence is judicial discussion of the specifics of the
case.1 86 Whatever their deficiencies, then, conventional forms of legal
explanation are either so general or so free of content that the judge's
job is primarily to think about a manageably specific set of circumstances. Thus in the past inattention to questions of intermediate generality has been consistent with the traditional view that the important
part of the Court's role is the resolution of specific controversies. The
182. See notes 142-49 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
184. See, eg., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494

(1951); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
185. See generally E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
186. See notes 160-63 supra and accompanying text.
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modem Court's emphasis on doctrine selection expresses and consolidates a radical shift in role from adjudicator to regulator.
This shift affects the quality of judicial opinions in important and
dismaying ways. Because the broad issue of how a class of cases ought
to be treated is a regulatory matter, general social facts seem naturally
relevant. Therefore modem opinions tend to convert moral choices
into social or political description. In the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson,187 for example, four members of the Court argued
that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." 188 Most of the justification for this determination was an interpretation of American social and political history. The plurality said that the nation's
189
experience with sex discrimination was "long and unfortunate"; women were "put... not on a pedestal, but in a cage"; 190 "throughout
much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War
slave codes"; 19 1 "women still face pervasive... discrimination in our
. . . institutions";1 92 and, finally, "the sex characteristic frequently
193
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."
This sweeping discussion is dismaying in part because the level of
the rhetoric was inappropriate to the facts of the case. The statute
struck down in Frontierorequired that female members of the armed
services prove that their husbands were financially dependent, but permitted the wives of male members of the services to be treated as dependent regardless of their actual financial situations. The complexity
here, as in so many sex discrimination cases, 194 is that a discrimination
against a female member of the service also (inevitably) is to the disadvantage of her husband, and a discrimination in favor of a male member of the service also (inevitably) is to the advantage of his wife - a
complexity with special relevance to a "dependency benefit" program.
General analogies between sex and race ring hollow in the context of a
187. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

188. 411 U.S. at 682 (footnotes omitted).
189. 411 U.S. at 684.

190. 411 U.S. at 684.
191. 411 U.S. at 685.
192. 411 U.S. at 686.
193. 411 U.S. at 686.
194. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (exclusion of men
from a state nursing school); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape
law that punished only males); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (statute allowing women to

drink beer at an earlier age).
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case that clearly illustrates one concrete respect in which the history of
sex discrimination is highly and specially ambiguous: the lives of men
and women are so closely tied together that harm and benefit cannot
be cleanly divided.
There may be good reasons for deciding to view the discrimination
involved in Frontieroas a disadvantage to women. Such reasons, however, would have to reply to the marginally employed wife who, because she did not have to risk her dependency benefits, was not
discouraged from remaining in the work force. Broad historical or
social descriptions are of little use here, for the ambiguity of the situation lies in the fact that both the servicewomen and the working women married to servicemen have interests. So severe is the Court's
shift from adjudicator to regulator in cases like Frontiero that the dispute is merely an occasion for social theorizing. As the plurality's
opinion demonstrates, in such instances the force of grand pronouncements can be critically undercut by the (largely ignored) circumstances of the case.
Frontiero illustrates another respect in which reliance on social
facts is dismaying. The analogy of women to blacks is a highly controversial one.195 Some of the same facts pointed to by the plurality can
be used to emphasize the ways in which women have been favored,
protected, and loved. Arguments about the analogy between sex and
race are not simply historical arguments that can be finally resolved by
more or better information. They are arguments for a moral vision; 19 6
they are depictions of ourselves and our history and our future. Such
visions change vocabulary and self-perception. The cultural decision
to view American history as invidious against women or to view gender as irrelevant to capacity is only partly responsive to facts. It is also
responsive to moral goals - to the changes people want to make in
each other. The Frontieroplurality is strikingly silent about matters of
will and vision. The fixation on historical, social, and physical facts
that tends to characterize debates about moral choice when cast at the
level of social policy impoverishes the plurality's opinion. Words that
"make and remake the world" 19 7 require an "attitude of looking away
from . . . principles, 'categories' . . . towards . . . consequences,
195. The long and unsuccessful effort to add the equal rights amendment to the Constitution
is some evidence that, despite the plurality's certitude, a substantial part of the population prefers
to view its history in a more benign or, perhaps, a more complicated way. For academic considerations of related issues, see J. ELSHTAI N, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN (1981); C. MCMILLAN, WOMEN, REASON AND NATURE (1982).
196. See B. BARBER, supra note 33, at 177.
197. This phrase is from B. BARBER, supra note 33, at 177.
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facts."198 If, as Professor White says,1 99 a people creates its culture in
part through constitutional controversies, attention to the specifics of a
case is a small guarantee that this process of self-definition will not be
debased by the simplifications and false determinism evoked by "scientific" descriptions of social or historical facts.
B.

The Abstract Perspective

The second general consequence of emphasizing the choice of intermediate principles is that doctrine selection is separated from doctrine application. This separation results naturally because the
importance attached to doctrine selection calls for separate and selfconscious treatment. The effect of the separation is to permit the decision as to choice of doctrine to be couched in cerebral tones, the intricacy and fullness of the actual dispute having been reserved for a
subsequent section of the opinion. It is largely this bifurcation of fact
and formula that makes the task of doctrine selection seem a practical
endeavor. That task, after all, requires a Court to choose in advance
three or four specific questions that will properly resolve myriads of
possible cases in areas as broad and unpredictable as "mixed speech
and nonspeech." Such endeavors do not seem quixotic at first, because
complexity and variety are acknowledged only after the doctrine is
selected. As cases continue to arise, however, the variety of possible
fact configurations gradually becomes more and more difficult to ignore. In several areas, such as separation of church and state,2 °° probable cause, 201 state sovereignty, 20 2 and abortion regulation, 20 3 the
incessant pressure of this variety eventually has begun to force the Justices to acknowledge what should have been immediately obvious: the
formulae are too simple and specific for the range of issues they are
designed to resolve.
198. W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, in PRAGMATISM and THE MEANING OF TRUTH 32 (1978)
(emphasis deleted), quoted and discussed in B. BARBER, supra note 33, at 177-78.
199. J. WHITE, supra note 33, at 264.
200. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
201. E.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
202. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
203. [Nleither sound constitutional theory nor our need to decide cases based on the application of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical framework that varies according
to the "stages" of pregnancy, where those stages, and their concomitant standards of review,
differ according to the level of medical technology available when a particular challenge to
state regulation occurs....

Our recent cases indicate that a regulation imposed on "a lawful abortion 'is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.'" In my view, this "unduly burdensome" standard should be applied to the challenged regulations throughout the
entire pregnancy without reference to the particular "stage" of pregnancy involved.
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-53 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Because the facts of the case tend not to affect doctrine selection,
decisions often contain painful incongruities, direct confrontation of
which would reveal the problematic nature of the moral premises underlying the doctrine selection decision. In Bakke, for instance, Justice Brennan's opinion contained (in section III) an almost
philosophical comparison of gender discrimination and remedial race
discrimination. 2°4 Pointing to similar potential for stigmatizing "powerless segments of society" and the immutability of both gender and
race, the opinion concluded that such classifications must be struck
down when a "searching" (but not "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact") judicial inquiry indicates that the program stigmatizes the politically powerless. 20 5 The need for this extended discussion arose because early in section III the opinion had rejected the possibility that
the university's purposes themselves contravened the "cardinal principle that racial classifications that stigmatize - because they are drawn
on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they
put the weight of government behind racial hatred. . . - are invalid
'20 7
without more. '20 6 Having established the Court's proper "role,
the opinion moved in section IV to a more particularized assessment
of the preferential admissions program under review. Here Justice
Brennan wrote:
If it was reasonable to conclude - as we hold that it was - that the
failure of minorities to qualify for admission at Davis under regular procedures was due principally to the effects of past discrimination, th[e]n
there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for pervasive racial discrimination, respondent would have failed to qualify for
admission even in the
20 8
absence of Davis' special admissions program.
This extraordinary passage suggests that a particularwhite applicant
would have had worse credentials than unnamed minority applicants
if American history had been entirely different. It purports to be a
claim about social causality. Its complexity is masked by simpleminded reciprocity: if past discrimination can reasonably be said to
have reduced the qualifications of minorities, then there is a "reasonable likelihood" that Bakke's qualifications are artificially inflated. In
fact, of course, it is not clear how racial configurations in general
would have been affected by a different social and political history, 20 9
204. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359-61 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
205. 438 U.S. at 362 (quoting Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RpV. 1, 8 (1972)).

206. 438 U.S. at 357-58.
207. 438 U.S. at 356.

208. 438 U.S. at 365-66.
209. It is possible, for example, that discrimination by whites hurts both whites and minori-
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and it is entirely uncertain how a changed history would have affected
Bakke's fortunes even had that changed history led to a larger number
of qualified minorities.
The passage, then, cannot be read as a serious statement about social causality. It does, nevertheless, communicate the moral judgment
that white people have benefited unfairly from racial injustices.
Although adorned with specious assumptions about social causality,
the force of the argument is not about hypothetical qualifications but
about moral entitlements. White people in general and Bakke in particular, having benefited unfairly from racial injustices, are less worthy
than competing minority applicants.
A fundamental objection to remedial racial discrimination, of
course, is precisely that it inevitably involves the government in conscious decisionmaking about how much various races deserve. This
course is feared because it requires judgments about the relative moral
worth of the races and, more pragmatically, because it might fuel racial competition and hatred. In Justice Brennan's opinion, these concerns were reflected in the word "stigma," defined in section III as
resulting from racial classifications that draw "on the presumption
that one race is inferior to another or [that] put the weight of the government behind racial hatred ....-210 The crucial step in doctrine
selection was the dismissal of the possibility that the purposes of remedial racial discrimination might be inherently stigmatizing. 2 1' However, the specific justifications for the Davis program in the doctrine
application section plainly undercut this dismissal, for these justifications themselves are painful illustrations of racially based moral judgments and competition. A mind attuned to the sounds being made in
section IV would have been far less certain of the moral issues decided
with such self-confidence in section III. The compartmentalization so
characteristic of the formilaic style impoverishes the Court's moral
discourse by allowing relatively abstract moral arguments to be uninformed by the richness and difficulty suggested by the case itself.
ties, so that a nondiscriminatory history could have improved Bakke's qualifications. Cf G.
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION ch. 2 (1971) (discrimination results in decrease
in net income of both blacks and whites). Under certain circumstances, it is possible that disfavored groups might respond to forms of discrimination in ways that improve their economic and
social standing. See T. SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA, A HISTORY 273 and passim (1981). It is
not inconceivable that favored groups might in some instances respond to their circumstances by
losing skills and, accordingly, status. "[T]he extent to which one group's poverty [and, it might
be added, social or professional standing] is caused by another group's bigotry is a causal question, not a foregone conclusion because of the moral repugnancy of bigotry." Id. at 273-74.
210. 438 U.S. at 357-58.
211. 438 U.S. at 357-58.
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C. The AdversarialPerspective
A third consequence of independent emphasis on doctrine selection is that the judiciary's adversarial relationship with the general culture is encouraged yet made to seem more natural and acceptable.
Formulae are calibrated judicial demands for justification of classes of
decisions made by others. One might expect that self-conscious concern about selection of formulae - about how closely the courts
should review decisions made by others - might sometimes lead to a
less adversarial relationship with other decisionmakers. Because of
this reassurance, the full and separate discussion of the Court's proper
role does tend to legitimize extension of judicial power. However, the
bases for reassurance are largely illusory. One reason is that doctrine
selection is couched as a preliminary issue, and therefore, like standing
or ripeness, is made to seem somehow a technical matter of special
concern to the judiciary. In a category of cases should judges have to
be convinced of a compelling state interest or of an important one or
merely of a legitimate one? Should judges accept post hoc rationalizations for a statute or should they demand to be shown the actual motives of the legislators? The perspective implicit in such questions
emphasizes the judiciary's capacities, and thus questions of power allocation tend to revolve narrow-mindedly around the courts. To justify
partial insulation from judicial oversight, the advocate must argue
against judges' self-respect and institutional self-interest. Moreover,
those representing other decisionmakers are put in the awkward position of arguing to judges that judges ought not be "conscientious,"
that they ought not examine a set of decisions closely. Cases begin, in
short, with the Court's prestige, self-importance, and power set against
the diffuse interests of other decisionmakers.
The interests of these other decisionmakers are assessed, at least as
a formal matter, independently of and prior to the resolution of the
case itself. Thus the need for judicial oversight is established in an
antiseptic setting. No matter what the Court decides about the issue
of doctrine selection, the competing decisionmaker might still prevail
in the doctrine application section. The concerns of the myriad unrepresented decisionmakers seem less immediate and less pressing because
the discussion of greatest relevance to them contains no announcement
of consequences. On the other hand, the emphasis on highly specific
considerations in the doctrine application section distances the eventual announcement of real consequences from those nonparties who
may eventually be affected but who do not share all the parties'
peculiarities.
During doctrine selection, the Court is not judging the case as a set
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of identifiable transactions or events. Instead it is demanding that
political and social institutions justify their insulation from judicial
oversight. This puts the culture itself - its language, its stereotypes,
and its institutions - on trial. The issue that opens nearly every major constitutional decision is the extent to which some aspect of the
culture can be trusted. The Justices' first duty in constitutional cases
is to set themselves apart from the larger culture. The law that
emerges from decisions structured in this way cannot build from or
participate in the traditions, understandings, and behaviors commonly
shared outside the nation's courtrooms.
CONCLUSION

This essay began by asking why the modem Court has so persistently adopted the cumbersome formulaic style. The immediate reasons were not hard to locate: the style is a conscientious effort to
maintain intellectual respectability while attempting to formulate and
implement complex policies through institutional layers and across
time. The "constitution" has become an ambitious political and social
agenda; the courts have become a kind of elevated bureaucracy, busily
crafting formulae that will bend the nation's affairs toward various
visions dignified by constitutional status. The difficulty is, as Professor
Barber said in a larger context, that those who "have been set on securing rights, realizing purposes, protecting interests, and in general
getting things done.., have had a difficult time making sense of conversation as a political art."' 212 The less immediate, but more basic
question, then, is why Justices and scholars have not been more dissatisfied with the awkward and degraded way of talking that has developed naturally along with the Court's instrumentalist role. Why are
those who want the Court to intervene with wisdom and effectiveness
in the culture not dismayed by a communicative style that isolates the
Court from the governed and from their ordinary experiences and
understandings?
Here I can offer only a speculation. The single most significant
event for present-day judges and scholars was the federal judiciary's
2 13
extended and often heroic assault on racial segregation in the South.
The profound formative influence of this struggle has shaped as has
nothing else law, role, and aspiration. The operative image has been of
the courts attacking a pernicious and deeply engrained part of popular
212. B. BARBER, supra note 33, at 183.
213. For a discussion of current attitudes toward the Warren Court, see Nagel, supra note
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culture. By degrees, I believe, this image of the judiciary as antagonist
to the popular culture has consolidated and grown, so that the courts'
basic function has become critic and reformer of the general culture.
No more than the arrogant modem painter or composer, whose roles
also are to uplift an unappreciative and uncomprehending mass sensibility, need the judiciary employ an idiom that draws on and is understandable to ordinary people.
It was one thing for the Warren Court to attack an aspect of a
largely regional culture. In doing so, it could draw on a more broadly
shared set of beliefs and attitudes. It is another thing for the current
Court persistently to isolate itself from the general culture, retaining
ties of language and intellectual approach only to an academic elite.
Unlike many, I am not sure what the Court's roles ought to be or even
how it should write its opinions. But if its roles require sensitive moral
judgments and the capacity to educate and move the people who provide continuing consent to the authority of the Constitution, the Court
must learn other ways of talking. It could learn something from reconsidering the idioms of past Courts. Constitutional law, certainly,
helps to shape the culture, but it cannot routinely assault that culture.
Law must begin somewhere, and it must shape by participating.

